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REVOCATION OF PROBATION AND PAROLE IN
NEBRASKA-A PROCEDURAL ANTITHESIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Although rehabilitation, in the sense of integrating or reintegrating the offender into community life, is generally considered
the primary objective of corrections today,1 the convicted offender
will still face notions of retribution, deterrence and control from
the moment of his sentencing until he is finally discharged.2 While
these various aims3 have often led to conflict and confusion in the
past, it has become increasingly apparent that the reconciliation of
"humanitarian and rehabilitative activities to the requirements
of control is the first order of business in any kind of correctional
planning." 4 For instance, the reformation of an offender may require
that he be confined in order to provide him with intensive treatment away from the undesirable influences of his outside life; at
the same time, his confinement also serves to restore social normalcy.5 Although a reasonable balance between rehabilitation and
control presently exists only in the most progressive institutions,
the concept of social restoration in a manner consistent with public
safety has been widely implemented through programs of proba-

1 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections 7 (1967) [hereinafter

2

cited as Task Force on Corrections].
Following his discharge, in addition to suffering the unofficial stigma
of being an ex-convict, the offender may also be deprived of numerous civil rights, such as voting, jury service, or holding public office.
See generally Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 88-92. How-

ever, Nebraska has made provision for the restoration of the civil
rights of prisoners upon their discharge by the Board of Pardons.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2634 (Reissue 1964), construed in Bosteder v.

3

Duling, 115 Neb. 557, 213 N.W. 809 (1927).
For a most enlightening discussion of the aims of corrections see
Mueller, Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REV. 58,
65-83 (1966).

AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY or
ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 62-63 (1965). The purposes and apparatus
of corrections in Europe likewise rest on a "precarious balance of
reason and unreason." For a comparison of the correctional patterns
in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union, see id. at 58-171.
5 Mueller, Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv. 58,
64 (1966).
4 J. CONRAD, CRnvIE AND ITS CORRECTION:

COMMENTS
tion,6 parole,7 and

most recently, work release. s Yet, even in such
enlightened programs the goal of resocialization has generally been
subordinated to considerations of control whenever an offender's
probation or parole has been subject to revocation because of an
alleged breach of the conditions of his release.
Except in the minority of states which statutorily provide for
revocation proceedings with procedural safeguards, 9 the liberty
enjoyed by the probationer or parolee has commonly been considered a matter of grace' 0 and consequently subject to revocation without due process trial-type safeguards or even a hearing
in many states." The point has been well made that offenders
who are not afforded what they consider to be a fair hearing on
the revocation issue will very likely be difficult subjects for future
reformation endeavors because it is probable that their confidence
in the correctional system as a whole will have been undermined.' 2 The judiciary's refusal to review these procedures by which
a man's liberty can be taken from him, effectually relegating the
probationer or parolee to the status of a non-citizen or worse, 3 has
6 "Probation shall mean a procedure under which a defendant, found
guilty of a crime upon verdict or plea, is released by the court, without imprisonment, subject to conditions imposed by the court and
subject to the supervision of the probation service." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2224(1) (Reissue 1964).
7 "Parole shall mean the release of a prisoner to the community by the
Board of Pardons prior to the expiration of his term, subject to conditions imposed by the board and to its supervision." NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2224(2) (Reissue 1964).
s 'Work release allows an individual to participate in unsupervised
employment in the community while residing in the institution during
his leisure hours." Carpenter, The Federal Work Release Program,
45 NEB. L. REV. 690, 690 n.2 (1966). See NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-440.01
(Supp. 1967).
9 A state-by-state statutory breakdown, which is in general still up-todate, is presented in Sklar, Law and Practice in Probationand Parole
Revocation Hearings, 55 J.Cams. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Sklar].
10 E.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
II E.g., Anderson v. Alexander, 191 Ore. 409, 229 P.2d 633 (1951) (revocation of parole); contra, People ex rel. Joyce v. Strassheim, 242 IlM.
359, 90 N.E. 118 (1909) (revocation of parole); Ex parte Lucero, 23
N.M. 433, 168 P. 713 (1917) (revocation of probation); People ex rel.
Combs v. LaVallee, 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1968)
(revocation of parole).
12 Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 83; Sklar, supra note 9,
at 196; Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and
Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 702, 734 (1963).
18 Aliens who have gained admission to the United States, even though
illegally, must be afforded a hearing conforming to traditional stan-
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been uneasily based on the doctrine of privilege. While this judicial
crutch has been weakened substantially 14 by recent bar admission 15
and disbarment cases' 6 and in decisions concerning public employees, 17 the first significant step toward procedural due process
in probation revocation proceedings did not come until the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Mempa v. Rhay.'8
Memapa v. Rhay held generally that counsel must be appointed
for an indigent "at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected."' 9 More spedards of fairness encompassed in due process of law before they can
be deported. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). However, an alien on the
threshold of initial entry into this country, but who has not yet become
a member of the American community, is not denied due process
when he is excluded without a judicial hearing. United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
14 "The greatest circumvention of the [right-privilege] distinction has
been achieved via the equal protection clause. Under that clause, it
seemingly makes no difference that the threatened interest is a privilege rather than a right. Even a privilege, benefit, opportunity, or
public advantage may not be granted to some but withheld from
others where the basis of classification and difference in treatment
is arbitrary." Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HAuv. L. 1Ev. 1439, 1454 (1968).
15 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S.
117, 146-47 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting opinion).
16 Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners of State Bar, 65 Cal. 2d 447,
452, 421 P.2d 76, 80, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 232 (1966); Application of

Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 90, 397 P.2d 205, 206-07 (1964). See generally
Note, Admision to Bar-Hallinanv. Committee of Bar Examiners of
State Bar, 47 NEB. L. REv. 128, 141-43 (1968).
17

See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).

38 389 U.S. 128 (1967). Jerry Mempa was convicted in Spokane County

19

Superior Court of the offense of joyriding based on his guilty plea
entered with the advice of court-appointed counsel. The imposition
of sentence was deferred and Mempa was placed on probation after
spending thirty days in the county jail as a condition of probation.
Four months later a proceeding was brought to revoke Mempa's probation on the grounds that he was involved in a burglary while on
probation. Mempa, who was seventeen at the time, was not represented by counsel and the court made no inquiry as to whether he
desired the assistance of his previously appointed counsel. Mempa's
probation was revoked when he affirmatively answered the court's
question as to his involvement in the alleged burglary. Mempa was
then sentenced to ten years' imprisonment with the recommendation
that he be required to serve only one year. Mempa's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, based on the ground that he was denied the
right to counsel at the revocation hearing, was denied by the Washington Supreme Court. Mempa v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2d 882, 416 P.2d 104
(1966). The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari,
Mempa v. Rhay, 386 U.S. 907 (1967).
389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).

COMMENTS
cifically, the high court ruled that "a lawyer must be afforded at

this proceeding whether it be labeled a revocation of probation
or a deferred sentencing. '20 While Mempa did not expressly state
that the probationer's due process right to appointed counsel also
encompasses the right to a meaningful hearing, the right to a revocation hearing is patent for '[w]ithout a hearing, even of an
informal kind, in which antagonistic facts can be rebutted and
favorable ones presented, the role of counsel is inevitably mar21
ginal.,
The procedural due process questions which permeate revocations of probation and parole will be discussed in this Comment
primarily in light of Mempa v. Rhay and In re Gault.22 Attention
will then shift to the disparity in the procedural elements presently
guaranteed probationers and parolees in revocation proceedings
under Nebraska law and whether the denial of a hearing to the
parolee is violative of equal protection of laws. The Comment will
conclude by suggesting legislation providing procedural safeguards
in the revocation hearing which not only will ensure the offender
a fair hearing but also will further the rehabilitative goals of the
concept of conditional release.
II. WHAT EFFECT MEMPA v. RHAY?
A. DUE

PROCESS AND THE PROBATION REVOCATION HEARING

Despite some seemingly straight-forward language in Mempa,
concern has been justly expressed that Mempa may not extend the
Gideon doctrine2 flatly to all probation revocation hearings 24
The unanimous Mempa opinion written by Justice Marshall falls
short of the mark in that its rationale appears to acknowledge
Jerry Mempa only as a person awaiting sentence, rather than as a
probationer whose conditional liberty is about to be revoked. Due
Id. at 137. It has been suggested, and was argued by the State, that
the term "deferred" may be misleading "since several states do have
the concept of 'deferred conviction,' under which a conviction is
'deferred' (not entered) while the defendant consents to supervision.
If the supervision succeeds, the conviction is never entered and a
criminal record is avoided." Rubin & Glen, Developments in Correc..tional Law, 14 CRmM & DEL N. 155, 162-63 (1968).
21 Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MnmN. L. REv. 803, 828 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Kadish]. "Appointment of counsel without affording an opportunity
for hearing on a 'critically important' decision is tantamount to denial
of counsel." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
20

22 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

23 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24 See Rubin & Glen, Developments in Correctional Law, 14 CRME &
DEnn.

155, 162 (1968).
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to this undeveloped aspect of the opinion, Mempa has been construed by some courts as a "sentencing decision '25 only applicable to
those probation revocations in which the imposition
of sentence has
26
been suspended during the probationary period.
Indeed, a federal district court in United States v. Hartsel 27 has
construed Mempa to apply only when it is possible for the probationer to lose some legal rights in the revocation-sentencing process
in addition to the possible loss of his liberty. The basis for this
stringent interpretation of Mempa is Justice Marshall's exhibited
concern that certain legal rights, including the right to appeal the
conviction, might be lost if not exercised at this stage of the criminal proceeding. 28 Under Washington law a defendant can appeal a
case involving a guilty plea followed by probation only after probation has been revoked and sentence has been imposed,29 which
was precisely the position in which Jerry Mempa found himself.
While clearly representation by counsel is needed to protect the
probationer's right to appeal in Washington following revocation
of his probation,"0 it is inconceivable that the only rights of the
probationer which due process will protect by an attorney's assistance are those which come into play after his probation has been
revoked by the court at a proceeding in which the probationer may
25

26

E.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 428 Pa. 210, 236 A.2d 805 (1968);
Petition of Croteau, - Mass. -, 234 N.E.2d 737 (1968); Holder v.
United States, 285 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tex. 1968).
Washington statutes provide that the court in granting probation may
suspend either the imposing or the execution of the sentence. WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.210 (1961).

When imposition of sentence is

suspended and one is placed on probation, sentence will only be imposed should the probationer violate the conditions of his probation.

Nebraska permits the court to suspend only the imposition of sentence during probation. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2218 (Reissue 1964).
27 277 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
28 Washington law also permits defendants convicted by their guilty
pleas to withdraw their pleas at any time prior to the imposition of
sentence should the trial judge find that the ends of justice will be
served by the withdrawal. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.40.175 (1961),
construed in State v. Shannon, 60 Wash. 2d 883, 376 P.2d 646 (1962).
29 State v. Farmer, 39 Wash. 2d 675, 237 P.2d 734 (1951). But see State
v. Longmore, 178 Neb. 509, 134 N.W.2d 66 (1965), which held that the
placing of a defendant on probation is a final appealable order even
though imposition of sentence has been suspended. The Nebraska
Supreme Court rejected the argument that acceptance of probation
is a voluntary waiver of the right of appeal and recognized that probation is a judicial abridgement of the liberty of an individual in the
public interest to account for his commission of an offense. Id. at
511-14, 134 N.W.2d at 69-70.
30 The Mempa Court is cognizant of the reality that guilty pleas are
frequently secured by offers of probation. See Enker, Perspectives on
Plea Bargaining, in The President's Commission on Law Enforce-

COMMENTS
be denied counsel. It seems manifest that appointment of counsel

to assist the probationer when the court is about the task of ascertaining whether he has violated his probation is a necessary prerequisite to representation of the probationer in matters which will
not even arise should it be determined that the probationer has not
violated the conditions of his probation. However, if we discard
the cautiously phrased legal niceties of the Mempa opinion, we
discover the basic issue in Mempa and in all revocation proceedings
-the simple proposition that a man's liberty is at stake with no real
procedural safeguards. Although the dearth of case law may indicate
a contrary conclusion, it is not inconceivable that the Court deemed
appointment of counsel at the fact-finding stage of the revocation
hearing so elementary in view of the substantial rights involved
that articulation of a rationale was thought superfluous. Regardless
of such supposition, it is clear that due process demands appointment of counsel at this stage of the probation revocation hearing
as well as when the court is in the process of making its final disposition of the case.31

B. Dun PROCESS AND PARoLE REvOCATION
Due to the uncertainty concerning the ratio decidendi of Mempa,
it is difficult to assess whether Mempa will affect parole revocation
procedures. If Mempa v. Rhay extends the right of appointed counsel to the indigent probationer as a probationer rather than as one
about to be sentenced, the argument can be made that an indigent
parolee should likewise be accorded this right at his revocation
33
proceeding as a matter of equal protection. 32 However, the Sixth,
34
35
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have distinguished the status of the
parolee from that of the probationer in Mempa on the grounds that
the parole board is not concerned with sentencing since the criminal case has ended, that sentence has already been imposed, and
that the parolee has been serving the sentence imposed.

31

32

33
34

35

ment and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts
108-19 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Task Force on The Courts]. If
the defendant were not represented by counsel at his probation revocation hearing, under Washington law he might easily lose his right
to appeal and end up with sentence being imposed on his prior guilty
plea based on alleged offenses for which he was never tried. Mempa
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1967).
Accord, Rubin & Glen, DeveZopments in Correctional Law, 14 Cm=m
& DEfi. 155, 170 (1968). See also Kadish, supra note 21, at 828.
Sklar, supra note 9, at 198 n.182; Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYmE L. REv. 638, 653 (1966). For
discussion of the equal protection issue see text accompanying footnotes 120-51.
Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968).
Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1968).
Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968).
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Notwithstanding these courts' view that Mempa is applicable
only when the judicial sentencing power is involved, it is arguable
that the Tenth Circuit erred in refusing to appoint counsel for the
indigent parolee in Williams v. Patterson 6 due to the workings of
the Colorado statutory procedure providing that a parolee who has
violated the terms of his parole cannot have his parole time credited
on his sentence.3 7 Revocation of parole in Colorado will automatically mean an increase in the total time during which the parolee
will be subject to correctional authority. 38 Therefore, it seems evident that the Colorado parole board's decision to revoke is a sentencing decision 9 under the ruling of Mempa v. Rhay. If Mempa
does require appointment of counsel for an indigent parolee released under a statute which does not give credit for street time
when the paroling authority seeks to revoke his parole,40 it would
logically follow that the Ninth Circuit likewise erred in Eason v.
4
Dicksoni
when it denied the parolee a right to appointed counsel,
because the California Penal Code 42 requires forfeiture
of the
43
parolee's good time credits due to a parole violation.
389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968).
§ 39-18-5 (1963), construed in Furlow v. Tinsley,
151 Colo. 280, 377 P.2d 132 (1962).
Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 87. It has been argued
that such an extension of one's sentence beyond that set in the initial
judicial proceeding is a deprivation of liberty without due process.
The contract theory, that a parolee by accepting as a condition of his
parole that his street time may be discounted has thereby consented
to this condition, has served as the basic rationale for rejection of the
due process argument. Smith v. Blackwell, 367 F.2d 539 (5th Cir.
1966); Van Horn v. Maguire, 328 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1964); Doherty v.
United States, 280 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1960). The fallacy of the so-called
contract theory is easily penetrated. See text accompanying footnotes
86-87.
See Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitationin ParoleRevocation Hearings, 72 YALE L.J. 368, 377 n.54 (1962).
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1964). NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2628 (Reissue 1964)
provides that the parolee shall not be allowed to count the time from
the date of his declared delinquency to the date of his arrest as time
served. This statutory language leaves the inference that the street
time prior to the violation does count toward the parolee's sentence.
390 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1968).
CAL. PEiAL CODE § 3053 (West 1956). See also NEB. REV. STAT. §
29-2628 (Reissue 1964), which provides for forfeiture of good time
upon violation of parole. According to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals
in Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1967), the right to good
time is contingent until the time arrives when its authorized allowance will end the prisoner's term of imprisonment. Pre-crediting of
good time amounts to no more than a bookkeeping entry in the
opinion of the court; the good time must be fully earned before it
becomes vested. Id. at 687.
Contra, McKinney v. Taylor, 358 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1966).

36
37 COLO. REV. STAT.
38

39
40

41
42

43
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The various theories for denying that due process requires a
hearing and certain minimal procedural safeguards for the revocation of parole have been discussed extensively and need not be
restated here.44 However, the foundation of these theories rests
basically on the concept of grace and considerations of administrative convenience.
1. Erosion of the Doctrine of Privilege
It has been stated that a parole board in revoking a parole
"occupies the role of a parent withdrawing a privilege from an
errant child not as punishment but for misuse of the privilege. ' 45 In
46
a very well reasoned dissent to Rose v. Haskins,
Judge Celebrezze
objects to summarily granting this act-of-grace assumption. 47 Judge
Celebrezze suggests that the parole granting decision may be considered an act of grace due to the distinctly discretionary nature
of the parole board's decision 4s-whether the prisoner is a fit candidate for rehabilitation in the community. In contrast, however,
revocation of parole does not involve a wholly discretionary determination, but rather is based upon a finding that the parolee has
violated one of the specified conditions of his parole. Consequently,
although the liberty granted the parolee may be considered a privilege, it is posited that due process does not permit arbitrary revocation under the guise of the privilege doctrine.

44 Sklar, supra note 9, at 193-98; Kadish, supra note 21, at 817-25; Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38
N.Y.U. L. REv. 702, 733-35 (1963); Comment, Revocation of Conditional Liberty-California and the Federal System, 28 S. CAL. L.
REv. 158, 162-69 (1955).
45 Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 957 (1963).
46 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968).
47 Id. at 99-100 (dissenting opinion).
48 Id. at 99 (dissenting opinion). Professor Kadish has very ably made
this distinction, too: "The sentencing determination, whether it be
performed by the judge after conviction or by a parole board in
deciding when and whether to release, entails a primary focus on
the intangibles of the rehabilitative potential of the offender coupled
with the needs of society for protection and for vindication. Here,
one would suppose, the range of the relevant reaches its apogee and
the grounds of judgment rest maximally on the expertise of the
professional clinical judgment. By contrast, however, commitment
redeterminations, whether by a court to revoke probation or by an
agency to revoke parole, involve an inquiry of narrower ambit, whatever the overlayer of discretion, of whether the releasee has complied
with standards of behavior which the judge or board expressly made
the condition of continued liberty." Kadish, supra note 21, at 828.
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The United States Supreme Court in In re Gault4 9 instructively
pointed out that while the commitment of juveniles may be principally for the purpose of their rehabilitation, the commitment is
nevertheless a deprivation of liberty which requires certain due
process safeguards. Despite the ostensible non-adversary nature
of the juvenile proceeding and the state's role as parens patriae,
Gault recognized that there are very real adversary interests in
the determination of delinquency. Therefore, the Court ruled that
the factual determination of whether the individual committed
the delinquent act must necessarily precede any plan of rehabilitation. Implementation of the essentials of due process into the juvenile court proceeding, the Court noted, does not require subordination of rehabilitation considerations, for the introduction of some
elements of the adversary system would enhance the appearance
as well as the actuality of fairness. It was felt that an atmosphere
of fair play would do more to encourage a therapeutic attitude on
the part of the child than would an informal commitment proceed50
ing.
It has been suggested that a parole revocation presents an analogous situation to the juvenile proceeding. 51 Continuation of the
parolee's liberty depends on the board of parole's determination of
whether the parolee has breached the conditions of his parole, an
adjudicatory fact. 52 Legal controls have often been considered inappropriate in parole revocation proceedings because the decisions
involved were depicted as professional and diagnostic in nature,
but there is a growing awareness that the objectives of rehabilitation will not be hindered by conceding that parolees have certain
legal rights.53 The Gault holding intimates that a trial procedure
is not the only fair procedure for finding facts and, therefore, that
due process does not require that the juvenile court proceeding
be encumbered by all the legal controls which safeguard one's rights
in a trial.54 However, Gault did find that due process requires that
49 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
50 Id. at 26.

51 Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56
52

GEo.

L.J. 705,

722-23 (1968). See also Address by Sol Rubin before the Congress of
Correction, August 22, 1967.
Sklar, supra note 9, at 197-98; Kadish, supra note 21, at 829; Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38
N.Y.U. L. REv. 702, 734 (1963).

53
54

Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 83.
For a discussion of the constitutional implications of Gault in terms
of the need for other procedural safeguards, see Comment, In re Gault
and the Persisting Questions of Procedural Due Process and Legal
Ethics in Juvenile Courts, 47 NEB. L. REv. 558 (1968).

COMMENTS
juveniles be given the right to appointed counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the privilege against
self-incrimination. It has been suggested that procedural due process requires similar safeguards when a court or a parole board is
making a violation determination.m5 5 Quite clearly the right to a
fair hearing and to appointed counsel is fundamental.
2. The Lessening Significance of Administrative Convenience

Many courts have not extended procedural safeguards to parole
revocations because of the traditional fear that such an award
would cause both the courts and the parole boards to be swamped by
frivolous claims, particularly so since prisoners "have little better
to do with their time." While the denial and the limitations of
many privileges and rights is necessary for imprisonment, there are
indications that the Supreme Court is evolving a theory that prisoners should be deprived of only those rights "which would be
detrimental to the administration and discipline of the institution."5 6 United States v. Muniz57 provides an outstanding example
of the Court's unwillingness to approve the repression of a prisoner's
rights unless the argument can be justified. Muniz held that a federal prisoner could maintain a suit against the government under
the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover for personal injuries sustained during his confinement in prison by reason of the negligence
of prison guards in failing to halt an assault upon him by other
prisoners. While recognizing that this grant of a negligence cause
of action to a federal prisoner might bring a flood of tort claims
to the federal courts, the Court considered this to be but "an
inescapable concomitant of any form of liability."581 The Court also
rejected the government's assertion that prison discipline might
be upset by the extension of legal rights to prisoners in that they
might spend their time fighting legal battles rather than accepting
the correctional regimen. 59
Likewise, considerations of administrative convenience did not
carry the day when the Court required police .to give persons under
55 For more extensive documentation of the due process arguments
that a parolee at his revocation hearing should be afforded a right
to appointed counsel, a right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and a right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination without being penalized for doing so, see Note, Parole Revocacation in the Federal System, 56 GEo. L.J. 705, 719-31 (1968).
-6 Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of
the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. Ray. 669, 673 (1966).
57

374 U.S. 150 (1963).

58 Id. at 162.
59 Id. at 163.
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interrogation warnings of their rights in Miranda v. Arizona.6 0 The
Miranda doctrine appears to have been significantly expanded by
the Court in Mathis v. United States6' which held inadmissible selfincriminating evidence obtained by a federal tax investigator from
a prisoner in the Florida State Penitentiary without warning him
of his right to be silent and right to counsel. The five-to-three majority 62 ruled that governmental employees conducting civil investigations which may lead to criminal prosecutions must give the
Mirandawarning to an individual taken into custody "or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way"6 3
and then subjected to questioning. The fact that Mathis was in
custody by reason of his conviction for another crime was held to
be no grounds for depriving him of his right to invoke his privilege
against self-incrimination."
At the very least, it can be said that Mathis and Muniz substantiate the proposition that the need for legal controls at parole revocation proceedings cannot be disregarded because of expediency.
While the Mathis Court's failure to better amplify the rationale for
its sweeping decision is "deeply troubling,"6 5 it is submitted that a
parolee at his revocation hearing qualifies as one who has been
deprived of his freedom by governmental authorities in a significant way. The conclusion of this syllogism requires that parolees
be extended the right to counsel (including appointed counsel for
indigents) 66 and the right to remain silent.
The Supreme Court appears to be on the threshold of extending
certain of the elements of procedural due process to parole revocation hearings. Some anxiety has been expressed that when judicial
supervision does come it may not only limit improper practices but
67
also control otherwise fair and necessary discretionary decisions.
The possibility of such mistakes can be minimized if correctional
officials will assume creative roles and implement needed safeguards
through administrative or legislative action.
60 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
61 391 U.S. 1 (1968).

Justice Marshall did not take part in the decision.
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 3 (1968), quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
64 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 3 (1968).
65 Id. at 4 (White, J., dissenting opinion).
66 See In re Menechino, 3 B.N.A. CR. L. REP. 2486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.
August 28, 1968), holding that a statute providing for a hearing before
parole can be revoked is meaningless if the parolee is not afforded
representation by counsel.
67 See generally Kimball & Newman, Judicial Intervention in Correctional Decisions: Threat and Response, 14 CRIME & DELIN. 1 (1968);
Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 83.
62
63

COMMENTS
III. PROBATION AND PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEDURES
IN NEBRASKA
An intelligent effort to draft constructive legislation demands
an understanding of the failures of the present statutory scheme.
While Nebraska statutes do not indicate whether a hearing is or
is not required for revocation of either probation s or parole, 69
the Nebraska courts have consistently afforded the probationer an
informal hearing when he has pleaded not guilty to the probation
violation allegation.70 The parolee in Nebraska has not been so
fortunate. While the Board of Pardons does require the Chief State
Parole Officer to make a written report of the parole violation
before parole will be revoked, the parolee has no right to a hearing
and in practice is not given a hearing. 71
A. REVOcATION OF PROBATION IN NEBRASKA

Although the Nebraska Supreme Court has considered probation to be a matter of legislative grace, the court nonetheless made
certain long before Mempa v. Rhay that probationers were provided
many procedural safeguards when their conditional liberty was
in jeopardy due to a violation charge. Each probationer in Nebraska
is guaranteed notice of all charges and a fair and impartial hear-

68

NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2219(3)

69

§ 29-2623 (Reissue 1964).
State v. Holiday, 182 Neb. 229, 153 N.W.2d 855 (1967), modified, 182
Neb. 410, 155 N.W.2d 378 (1967); Reinmuth v. State, 163 Neb. 724, 80
N.W.2d 874 (1957); Phoenix v. State, 162 Neb. 669, 77 N.W.2d 237
(1956); Young v. State, 155 Neb. 261, 51 N.W.2d 326 (1952); Carr v.
State, 152 Neb. 248, 40 N.W.2d 677 (1950); Moyer v. State, 144 Neb.
673, 14 N.W.2d 220 (1944); Moore v. State, 125 Neb. 565, 251 N.W. 117

70

(Reissue 1964).

Nm. REV. STAT.

(1933); Sellers v. State, 105 Neb. 748, 181 N.W. 862 (1921).
71

Interview with Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General of Nebraska,
in Lincoln, June 24, 1968. The attorney general is a member of the
Board of Pardons, the paroling authority in Nebraska, NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2604 (Reissue 1964). There is only one parole revocation
hearing on record, and that proceeding was actually a reconsideration of the board's ex parte revocation order. The petition for
reconstruction was brought by the mother of the parolee's child,
who was born out of wedlock. The petition asked that the father
be continued on parole in order that he might return to his job
and thereby enable him to pay her medical expenses and child
support. The only record of the reconsideration proceeding is the
board's denial of the petition, but apparently the parolee was represented by counsel retained by the mother at the hearing. Interview
with Eugene E. Neal, Chief State Parole Officer of Nebraska, in Lincoln, June 10, 1968.
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ing.7 2 Preciseness of charges is not vital to sustaining the revocation
hearing,73 but a proper charge is necessary. 74 Before revocation can
be upheld a violation of conditions must be established by clear and
satisfactory evidence, 7 but neither a jury trial nor proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is required. 76
While one's probation can only be revoked upon a finding of a
violation of conditions,77 a second question arises if a violation is
found-whether to set aside the probation and impose the penalty
which the court might have imposed before placing the offender on
probation or to continue the probation. 7 In making this latter decision Nebraska courts are "not limited to a consideration of probative evidence of matters arising subsequent to the order of probation,' 7 9 but can exercise broad powers of inquiry in their attempts
to more fully understand the individual offender.
Representation by retained counsel was also permitted by the
high court of Nebraska prior to Mempa,80 but due process was not
deemed to make available to the indigent a corresponding right to
appointed counsel. 8 ' But immediately following the Mempa decision, in a supplemental opinion reversing and remanding State v.
72

State v. Holiday, 182 Neb. 229, 231-32, 153 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1967),

modified, 182 Neb. 410, 155 N.W.2d 378 (1967); Phoenix v. State, 162
Neb. 669, 673, 77 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1956).
73 Phoenix v. State, 162 Neb. 669, 673, 77 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1956); Carr
v. State, 152 Neb. 248, 250, 40 N.W.2d 677, 680 (1950).
74 State v. Holiday, 182 Neb. 229, 232, 153 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1967), modified, 182 Neb. 410, 155 N.W.2d 378 (1967); Moyer v. State, 144 Neb.
673, 676, 14 N.W.2d 220, 222 (1944).
75 In Moyer v. State, 144 Neb. 673, 14 N.W.2d 220 (1944), a probation
revocation was reversed because there was no probative evidence
of violation. The court held that the probationer's move of some 34
blocks from one Omaha address to another was not a violation of
the statutory condition that the probationer "shall remain or reside
within a specified place or locality." Likewise, the court held that
the probationer did not violate the statutory prohibition against
association with "persons of disreputable or harmful character" by
being seen out on the street with her husband, from whom she was
apparently separated, at 1:30 A.M.
76 State v. Holiday, 182 Neb. 229, 232, 153 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1967), modified, 182 Neb. 410, 155 N.W.2d 378 (1967); Phoenix v. State, 162 Neb.
669, 673, 77 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1956).
77 State v. Holiday, 182 Neb. 229, 153 N.W.2d 855 (1967), modified, 182
Neb. 410, 155 N.W.2d 378 (1967); Young v. State, 155 Neb. 261, 51
N.W.2d 326 (1952); Moyer v. State, 144 Neb. 673, 14 N.W.2d 220 (1944).
78 Young v. State, 155 Neb. 261, 268, 51 N.W.2d 326, 330-31 (1952).
79 Id. at 269, 51 N.W.2d at 331.
80 Phoenix v. State, 162 Neb. 669, 77 N.W.2d 237 (1956); Sellers v. State,
105 Neb. 748, 181 N.W.862 (1921).
81 State v.Holiday, 182 Neb.229, 153 N.W.2d 855 (1967).

COMnIENTS
Holiday82 which had denied court-appointed counsel to an indigent
probationer at his revocation hearing, the Supreme Court of Nebraska without reservation extended the right to appointed counsel
to probation revocation hearings. Since no sentence is imposed on
probationers in Nebraska until after revocation,8 3 Holiday fell
squarely under the Mempa holding regardless of whether Mempa
is applicable to probation revocations in general or only to those
in which sentence has not yet been imposed.
The safeguards afforded the Nebraska probationer in the revocation process stand in stark contrast to the dearth of protection
extended the Nebraska parolee. The Nebraska courts have never
really tried to reconcile this gross disparity, but it probably can
best be explained in that probation revocations are conducted by
the courts while parole revocations are conducted by an administrative agency.
B. REVOCATION OF PARoLE m NEBRAsKA
1. Nebraska's Parole Act Makes No Provisionfor a Hearing
In those jurisdictions which have hearing safeguards for parole
revocations, there has normally been a statute providing for an
opportunity to be heard, with the judiciary frequently interpreting
82
83

182 Neb. 229, 153 N.W.2d 855 (1967), modified, 182 Neb. 410, 155
N.W.2d 378 (1967).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2218 (Reissue 1964). Moore v. State, 125 Neb.
565, 251 N.W. 117 (1933), construed what are the present § 29-2218
and § 29-2219 to empower the district courts to place defendants on
probation only before pronouncing sentence. Suspension of the imposition of the sentence in this way permits the court to maintain a
substantial degree of leverage over the probationer, for upon violation
of a probation condition the court can impose any sentence the law
would have permitted in the first instance. The Nebraska Supreme
Court noted that should courts be required to pass sentence initially,
they might give the defendant a light or minimum sentence for
which they would later regret should the probationer indicate serious
criminal tendencies during his probation. Id. at 568, 251 N.W. at 118.
Phoenix v. State, 162 Neb. 669, 77 N.W.2d 237 (1956), clearly denotes why one might hesitate to accept probation in Nebraska. The
probationer had completed all but two weeks of his 3-year probation
term when an information was filed against him charging him with a
violation of probation on the grounds that he failed to report to his
probation officer one month, that he left the state without the officer's
permission, and that he did not notify the officer of his change of
address. Two months after the expiration of the probation period an
amended information was filed withdrawing the charge that the
probationer left the state without permission but adding the charge
that the probationer failed to report to his officer the last 7 months
of his probation term. The probation was revoked and the defendant
was thereupon sentenced to 3 years imprisonment. The Supreme
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this provision to necessarily require other procedural elements.s
Nebraska parole statutes, however, neither make provision for a
hearing in revocation proceedings nor require that revocation must
be for cause:
The Board of Pardons shall have power to establish rules and
regulations under which prisoners within the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex may be allowed to go upon parole outside
the building and enclosure, but to remain while on parole in the
legal custody and under the control of the board.... The board shall
have full power ... to retake and reimprison any inmate so upon

parole at any time, with or without cause.85

The leading Nebraska case concerning the parolee's rights at his
revocation proceeding is the early case of Owen v. Smith,s" which
construed virtually the same parole statute as set out above. The
Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the revocation by the governor,
although made without notice or hearing, on the ground that the
parolee had entered a parole agreement with the governor when
granted his conditional release and the governor was only exercising one of his prerogatives under this contract. The court
sought to ease the harshness of the decision by positing that should
the court require notice and full hearings to revoke paroles, the
governor would be much less inclined to grant paroles.
Court of Nebraska upheld the revocation finding that "a violation
occurring on the last day of probation could still properly result in
the revocation of probation after the probationary term" if the
revocation procedure was instituted within the probationary period
or within a reasonable time thereafter. Id. at 675, 77 N.W.2d at 241.
In addition to the argument that imposition of a prison term in
excess of the probationer's remaining probation term is a denial of
liberty without due process, see discussion supra note 38, the argument has been raised that the great uncertainty which is inherent in
any suspension of the imposition of sentence raises serious questions
of procedural fairness. The feeling is expressed that the penalty for
the crime ought to be determined by circumstances known at the
time of the sentence-that probation should not be a test of what
punishment should be, particularly so since violations of probation
are not determined by a trial. Hink, The Application of Constitutional
Standards of Protection to Probation, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 483, 495-96
(1962).
84 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-206 (1940) providing that the parolee be
given "an opportunity to appear" before the parole board was construed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to mean that
the parolee had the right to appear through retained counsel and to
present evidence, Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
85 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2623 (Reissue 1964).
86 89 Neb. 596, 131 N.W. 914 (1911). While it is unclear from the Owen
opinion whether the court was considering a conditional pardon or a
parole, the rationale has subsequently been applied to both forms
of conditional release. Losieau v. Sigler, Civil No. 718L (D. Neb., filed
Sept. 25, 1964).

COMMENTS
The court's reasoning is fallacious on both counts. Conditions of
parole are not agreed upon by the parties but are instead prescribed
by the board of parole. Such a "contract" is adhesive in nature, for
a person whose only alternative is imprispnment is likely to accept
whatever conditions are imposed. Because of the inherent inequality
in the parolee's bargaining position with the board, the argument
that the parolee has waived his constitutional right of due process
is patently spurious.8 7
As to the hypothesis that there is an inverse relationship between
the expansion of procedural safeguards to parole revocation hearings and the number of paroles a parole board will grant, there is
substantial evidence pointing to the contrary. Michigan and Washington both provide parolees with a revocation hearing and an
opportunity to appear with retained counsel at the hearing,88 yet
Michigan's parole rate is well over eighty percent and Washington's
parole rate is one hundred percent.8 9 The parole rate represents
the number of inmates released on parole as a percentage of all
persons released from prison in the state during the year. In contrast, Nebraska provides no procedural safeguards at all and maintains the meager parole rate of twenty percent.
Customary parole revocation procedure in Nebraska is as follows: 00

(1) on the basis of the information he has at hand, the Chief State
Parole Officer determines whether the parolee has violated a condition of his parole;
(2) if the Chief State Parole Officer feels a significant violation has
occurred, he issues a warrant for the parolee's arrest;
Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12
WAYNE L. REv. 638, 645-46 (1966); Note, Legal Aspects of Probation
Revocation, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 311, 324 (1959); Comment, Parole: A
Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV.
702, 710-11 (1963).
88 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.2310 (1) (1968 Supp.); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.95.120 (1961). However, it must be conceded that very few parolees
87

can afford counsel, which makes somewhat arguable the proposition

that the revocation safeguards provided by Michigan and Washington are too inconsequential to truly judge the effect that a guarantee
of a fair revocation hearing with assigned counsel would have on
parole release practices.
89 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions for Adult Felons,

1964, 38 Nat. Prisoner Statistics Bull. 11 (1965). The table is reprinted
in Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 61.

90 Interview with Eugene E. Neal, Chief State Parole Officer of Ne-

braska, in Lincoln, June 10, 1968.
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(3) upon arrest the parolee is returned to the penitentiary; and
(4) a written report of the parole violation is presented by the
Chief State Parole Officer to the Board of Pardons at its next
monthly meeting, at which time the board makes its revocation
decision solely on the basis of the report.
This system, effectively places the revocation decision in the
hands of the Chief State Parole Officer, thereby combining the conflicting functions of prosecutor and judge in one man. The primary
aim of the present Nebraska parole system is control, not rehabilitation.91 Although control is necessary for a successful parole plan,
both in terms of protecting society and in attaining public confidence
and cooperation, 2 it should be recognized as the basis from which
the ultimate objective of resocialization can be pursued rather
than as the millennium itself. The Nebraska system's seeming
disorientation can be somewhat explained by the practical reality
that three parole officers with some assistance from ten already
overburdened district probation officers can do little more than
keep track of the more than four hundred parolees scattered
throughout the state.98 Regardless of the reasons for this misapplication of the parole concept, the Nebraska parolee not only does
not share the procedural safeguards possessed by the Nebraska probationer, but the interests of the official making the violation determination are diametrically opposed to the parolee's interest in retaining his conditional freedom.94
91 Id.
92

Considerations of control responsibility weighed heavily in a recent
decision of the Court of Claims of New York awarding a claimant
$110,000 because of the negligent supervision of a paroled juvenile
delinquent. Wasserstein v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 225, 288 N.Y.S.2d 274
(1968). The state was ruled negligent for failing to expeditiously pick
up the juvenile when it was learned that he had violated the conditions of his parole by being truant from home and school for several
days. The parole officer ordered the juvenile reincarcerated as a parole
violator, but no arrest warrant was issued until 2 days later, during
which time the parolee shot the claimant causing his blindness.

93 NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 29-2215

(Reissue 1964) provides that probation
officers may act as parole officers upon request. Presently, in accordance with an unwritten agreement between the Chief State Parole
Officer and the District Court Judges Association which supervises
the probation system, probation officers outside of Lincoln and
Omaha do serve as deputy parole officers. Interview with W. Paul
Beave, Lancaster County Adult Probation Officer, in Lincoln, June
28, 1968.
94 "Parole agents are human, and it is possible that friction between
the agent and parolee may have influenced the agent's judgment. In
fairness to the violator this is a possibility which should be investigated by some higher authority." 4 ATToRNEY GENERAL's SURVEy ON
RELEASE PRocEDuRE 246-47 (1939).

COMMENTS
Unchecked power has always been considered incompatible
with our system of government. There seems to be no reason to
abandon this principle with regard to persons convicted of crime,
for a conviction does not mean that the offender "has forfeited all
rights to demand that he be fairly treated by officials." 95 The present
parole revocation procedure which delegates virtually uncontrolled
discretion to the Chief State Parole Officer over the liberty of the
parolee has no constitutional justification. While a prisoner may
have no constitutional right to parole, it is submitted that once
paroled he cannot be deprived of his liberty by means inconsistent
with due processY8
2. Are ParoZe Revocations "Contested Cases" Under the Nebraska
AdministrativeProceduresAct?
Although the issue apparently has never been raised, parole
revocation proceedings may be governed by the procedural guarantees of the Nebraska Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter cited as "NAPA").9' Administrative boards which are authorized by statute to make rules and regulations qualify as "agencies"
under the Act.8 9 Despite the fact that the legislative history of
NAPA provides negligible help in determining whether the Board
of Pardons is governed by the Act,99 the board is authorized by
statute to make rules'00 and the board did file a copy of its rules
with the secretary of state in apparent compliance with the Act.'0 1
For those adherents of the rule of contemporaneous construction
95 Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 83.

90 Cf. Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941).
97 Nm. Rnv. STAT. § § 84-901 to 916 (Reissue 1966).
98 Nm. RhV. STAT. § 84-901(1) (Reissue 1966).
99 Record of debate on the floor of the Unicameral has been kept only
since 1961. The records of the hearings on the act by the Committee
on the Judiciary are likewise very sketchy. It appears that the only
state agencies which have formally opposed inclusion under NAPA
are the Railway Commission and the Highway Department, Hearing
on L.B. 362 Before the Comm. on Judiciary, 69th Neb. Leg. Sess. at
5-6 (1959).
100 E.g., NEm. RBv. STAT. § 29-2611, § 29-2618, and § 29-2622 (Reissue
1964).
101 The General Rules of the Board of Pardons were filed June 21, 1945,
with the secretary of state as required by what is presently Nm.
REV. STAT. § 84-902 (Reissue 1966), requiring that agencies governed
by the act shall file certified copies of the rules in force in those agencies on August 10, 1945. These rules, as revised, provide that "in the
event of parole violation, the facts shall be presented to the board,
at either a regular or special meeting and the board shall determine
whether or not a parole shall be revoked." Rule VII, General Rules of
the Nebraska Board of Pardons.
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0 2
of statutes,'
the board's acknowledgement that it is covered by
the act would normally be entitled to substantial weight in any
subsequent interpretation of the statute by the courts. Inclusion
of the Board of Pardons under NAPA does not conflict with the
Pardon and Paroles Act, although the latter expressly states that no
person shall be released under any other procedures except those
specifically prescribed by the parole act,10 3 because the subsequently
enacted Administrative Procedures Act was "intended to constitute an independent act establishing minimum administrative procedure for all agencies."' 1 4 This statement of legislative intent certifies that NAPA was not intended to supersede the rules of the
various agencies, but rather was meant to complement their rules
and to ensure that the essentials of fair play are being followed in
all proceedings which are included within the act's definition of
"contested case."'105

While the Board of Pardons appears to qualify as an agency
under NAPA, there is some question as to whether a parole revocation proceeding is a contested case under the act. Contested case is
defined as "a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights,
duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing."' 0 6
'While Nebraska law clearly does not make such provision, it is
07
arguable that the Federal Constitution does.
Assuming arguendo that a parole revocation is a contested case,
the procedure required by NAPA is "essentially that which is normally used in adversary proceedings.' 0 8 However, the Nebraska
Supreme Court has recently held that in applying NAPA to the
administrative process "some consideration must be given to the
particular nature of the state board including its purpose and function." -0 9 Therefore, County of Blaine v. State Bd. of Equalization
and Assessment" ° ruled that state boards need not afford parties
102
103

E.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294,
315 (1933).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2605 (Reissue 1964).

104

NsB.

105

NEB.

REV. STAT. § 84-916 (Reissue 1966).
Ray. STAT. § 84-901(3) (Reissue 1966).
106 Id. (emphasis added).

See text accompanying footnotes 32-66. Since the statute makes no
allusion to the Nebraska Constitution this writer feels his assumption
that the statute is referring to the Federal Constitution is warranted.
108 County of Blaine v. State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment,
180 Neb. 471, 474, 143 N.W.2d 880, 883 (1966).
109 Id. at 474, 143 N.W.2d at 883.
110 180 Neb. 471, 143 N.W.2d 880 (1966).
107

COMMENTS
all the procedural elements set out by the act where the parties are
numerous and the issues complex, but each board must adopt a
reasonable method of procedure."'
There is scarcely any doubt that like considerations of administrative practicality, because of the present ex-officio composition of
the Board of Pardons, would prevent full application of all procedural safeguards in NAPA" 2 to parole revocation proceedings.
Because of the many other demands upon the governor, secretary of
state, and the attorney general, who comprise the board," 3 a substantial and probably impractical burden would be placed upon
the board to require anything beyond a very informal hearing.
The solution to this organizational dilemma appears obviouschange to a professional parole board which not only will have time
to make proper deliberations, but will also bring correctional
li

112

113

Id. at 474-75, 143 N.W.2d at 883. In County of Blaine v. State Bd. of
Equalization and Assessment, the order and notice requiring the
representatives of Blaine County to appear before the state board
failed to state the issues that were to be considered at the hearing.
The court found that the primary duty of the Board of Equalization
was the establishment of uniformity in taxation between the counties
and that the purpose of the hearing was to provide an opportunity
for the county's representatives to appear and show cause why the
valuation of the county should or should not be changed. Therefore,
the Nebraska high court held that NAPA requires the notice of hearing in contested cases to state the issues involved and, as applied
to the facts of the case, to state the percentage adjustment which
the board proposes to make in that county. But County of Blaine
does not compel the board to afford parties the other procedural elements set out by the act.
Full application of NAPA to parole revocation proceedings would
provide the parolee with: (1) a hearing, after reasonable notice, at
which he would have the opportunity to present evidence and argument, NEB. RE. STAT. § 84-913 (Reissue 1966); (2) the right to have
the board issue subpoenas to compel both the attendance of witnesses
and the production of papers, NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-914(2) (Reissue
1966); (3) the right to cross-examine witnesses and to submit rebuttal
evidence, NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(4) (Reissue 1966); (4) the right
to judicial review of the final decision of the board, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 84-917(1) (Reissue 1966). Rules of legal evidence are not required
by the act, enabling the board to admit evidence "which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the
conduct of their affairs." NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-914(1) (Reissue 1966).
Final decisions by the board must be in writing or stated in the
record and shall be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions
of law, NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-915 (Reissue 1966), and are entitled
to de novo review by the district court without a jury, NEB. REV.
STAT. § 84-917(5) (Reissue 1966).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2602 (Reissue 1964); NEB. CoNsT. art. 4, § 13
(1920).
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expertise into the decision.114 Such a professional parole board,
however, has been an impossibility because of Article 4, section 13
of the Nebraska Constitution, 1 5 which made mandatory the exofficio board. But on November 5, 1968, the Nebraska electorate
resoundingly ratified an amendment to the constitution 1"6 which
enables the legislature to establish a Board of Parole and to prescribe the qualifications for board members." 7 It should be noted
that the amendment is merely permissive, it does not of itself alter
the present composition of the board due to the codification of the
ex-officio board in section 29-2602 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes."" But it does seem probable that legislation providing for a
professional parole board will be forthcoming since the present
officials manning the board recognize that they lack both the time
and expertise to properly perform this function and are encouraging
legislative change." 9 The feasibility of any realistic extension of
114 While there are three states which combine ex-officio members and
citizen representation on their parole boards, only Nebraska and
Wyoming have completely ex-officio parole boards. It is worthy of
note that Nebraska ranks 47th and Wyoming ranks 49th among the
states with regard to parole rates (percentage of those released on
parole/all persons released). Nebraska's parole rate of 20.1% falls
far short of the national average of 60.1%. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics: Prisonersin State and
FederalInstitutionsfor Adult Felons, 1964, 38 NAT. PRIsoNER STATISTICS
BuLL. 11 (1965). The table has been reprinted in Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 61. The Task Force Report forthrightly concludes that "ex-officio parole board members have neither the time
nor the kind of training needed to participate effectively in correctional decision-making." Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1,
at 66.

Conrad notes that the net effect of laymen making the release
decision is frequently a reduction in the credibility of the correctional system's rehabilitation objectives. When an inmate does
achieve substantial progress through institutional treatment, but is
not released, the confidence of both inmates and clinicians suffer. J.
CoNRAD, CRiME AND ITS CoRREcTIoN: AN INTERNATIONAL SuRVEy or
ATnTIuES AD PRAc~rczs 53 (1965).
115 NEB. CONST. art. 4, § 13 (1920).
116 L.B. 561, 77th NEB. LEG. SEss. (1967).
117 The amendment does not affect the composition of the Board of
Pardons or its pardoning power, but it does shift the parole power
from the Board of Pardons to a separate Board of Parole to be established by the legislature.
118 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2602 and § 29-2604 (Reissue 1964).
119 The Governor's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
has approved a legislative proposal for a professional Board of Parole,
consisting of a full-time chairman and 2 part-time members. Lincoln
Star, December 14, 1968, at 24, col. 3. See also Inaugural Address by
Governor Norbert T. Tiemann, Jan. 5, 1967; Omaha World Herald,
August 7, 1966, at 6-B, col. 1; Lincoln Evening Journal & Nebraska

COMMENTS
procedural safeguards to parolees at their revocation proceedings,
whether by judicial construction of NAPA or by future parole
legislation, is dependent upon the establishment of a professional
board of parole.
Unless there is some rational ground for distinguishing the status
of the probationer from that of the parolee, it would seem that the
marked discrepancy in the procedural safeguards granted in revocations of probation as compared with those provided in revocations of parole constitutes invidious discrimination violative of
equal protection of laws.120 Certainly the fact that the probation
revocation decision is made by a different authority, a court rather
than a parole board, does not provide a reasonable basis for dissimilar classification. 121 The argument most frequently advanced
as justification for providing better procedural protection for the
probationer is that he is generally a safer risk than the parolee.
The premise of this proposition is that a parolee by definition has
been refused probation by the sentencing judge on one of two
grounds--"[e]ither his crime was one of those regarded as so
heinous that the judge was prohibited by statute from granting
probation, or the judge, when weighing the question of risk to the
public versus rehabilitative potential, decided that this defendant
122
was too dangerous to place on probation."'
State Journal, January 19, 1967, at 6, col 1, March 30, 1967, at 5,
col. 1, April 3, 1967, at 6, col. 1.
120

To a lesser degree this charge would appear valid against the Model

Penal Code. The Code provides the probationer at his revocation hearing with the right to be represented by counsel, the right to hear

and controvert the evidence against him, and the right to offer evidence in his defense. MODEL PNAL CODE § 301.4 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962). The Code, in contrast, only permits the parolee to
"advise with his own legal counsel" at the parole revocation hearing.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.15 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). No
rationale is stated to explain the disparity in the procedural safeguards authorized for the two proceedings, but there are indications
that the decision was based on administrative convenience. See 33
ALl PROCEEDiNGS 259 (1956).

In Baine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P.2d 554 (1959), the Utah
Supreme Court held that a hearing is necessary for revocation of
probation, as well as for revocation of parole. 'Whether the defendant be placed on probation or parole, and by whatever method this
is effected, the fundamental and controlling consideration is the status
of the defendant in relation to the court and its authority. The rights
and duties depend upon the nature of that relationship. This is determined by what is done and the purpose thereof, rather than upon
the technical aspects of the ritual by which it is accomplished." Id.
at 9, 347 P.2d at 558.
122 Comment, The Rights of the Probationer:A Legal Limbo, 28 U. PITT_
L. REv. 643, 650-51 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
121

242

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 48, NO. 1 (1968)

C. EQuAL PROTECTION FOR THE NEBRASKA PAROLEE
1. The Essential Identity of Probationer and Parolee
Before examining the merits of the proposition that a parolee
is not as safe a risk as a probationer, we must first determine
whether such a distinction, if valid, has "some relevance to the
purpose for which the classification is made."' 123 For if the rationale
underlying the preferential treatment afforded probationers as
compared to parolees is deemed arbitrary, the state of Nebraska's
discrimination against the parolee is a denial of equal protection
of laws. 12 4
The relevance of the risk theory to a decision on what procedural
safeguards are needed in making the factual determination of
whether a parolee has violated the conditions of his parole appears
hard put for justification in light of the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Baxstrom v. Herold.125 In Baxstrom, a
prisoner in a New York Department of Correction hospital for
mentally ill prisoners was recommitted civilly as he neared the
end of his criminal sentence without the jury review of the determination as to his sanity which is granted all others civilly committed under the New York Mental Hygiene Law. The Court
found that the hospital's classification of the prisoner as criminally
insane "may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining
the type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no
relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to show
whether a person is mentally ill at all."'126 Therefore, the denial of
judicial review before a jury of the factual question of the prisoner's
mental illness on the grounds that he was dangerous and had
"proven criminal tendencies" was found to be capricious and violative of the equal protection clause.
Where fundamental rights and liberties are at stake, classifications which might invade, restrain, or deprive one of his liberty
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. 27 Probation and
parole are in substance identical, providing for the conditional
123

Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).

124

See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886). Perhaps the most meaningful analysis of the

equal protection test of "arbitrary classification" can be achieved by

recognizing that it is almost indistinguishable from the substantive
due process test of "unreasonable regulation." See Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1456 (1968).
125
126

127

383 U.S. 107 (1966).

Id. at 111.

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
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release of convicted criminals to society subject to revocation
should they fail to conform to the required conditions. 128 The essential identity of the probationer and parolee was elucidated by
Judge Celebrezze in his dissent to Rose v. Haskins:
Each has been found guilty of a crime; each has been deemed
worthy of rehabilitation; and each has been given a status that is
considerably more desirable than that of a prisoner. When revo-

cation is threatened,
they all have the same interest in maintaining
29

that status.1

The equal protection clause, like the due process clause, is not
static' 30 and extension of its protection to the parolee in the context of Nebraska parole revocation procedure seems clearly warranted.
2. Can Parolees Be Rationally Classified as More Dangerous than
Probationers?
Even assuming that the proposed classification based upon the
risk theory might be a rational basis for differentiating the procedural safeguards afforded in probation and parole revocations,
a recent study indicates that conclusions drawn as to the danger
an offender presents to society on the basis of whether he was
placed on probation or in an institution are of very uncertain validity because sentencing patterns vary radically among jurisdictions and even among judges. 31 These disparities are explained in
part by the differences in quality of available correctional programs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but differences in judges'
philosophies are also a contributing factor.3 2 Yet, should a parolee
128

Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 86-88; Sklar, supra note

9, at 198 n.182; Kadish, supra note 21, at 814; Comment, Due Process
and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 638, 638-39
(1966); 1 K. DAvis, ADmvmsTmrvE LAW TiEAnSE § 7.16 at 176-77
(Supp. 1965).
129 Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 103 (6th Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion)
(footnotes omitted).
130 Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
131 CALIFoRNIA DEP'T OF THE

YouTH

AumoRITY, AN'uAL STATISTCAL RE-

PORT, 1965 (1966). For a synopsis of the report and its implications
see Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 18.
132 Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 18. Efforts are being made
within the judiciary to eliminate unjustified sentencing disparity.
Sentencing councils are being introduced in multijudge courts to
enable each court's judges to meet regularly to consider what sentences should be imposed on offenders whose cases are pending before
the court. Levin, Toward A More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure,
45 NEB. L. REV. 499 (1966). Both federal and state judges are now
participating in institutes devoted entirely to sentencing. See Youngdabl, Developments and Accomplishments of Sentencing Institutes
in the Federal Judicial System, 45 NEB. L. REv. 513 (1966).
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sentenced in the Scotts Bluff County District Court have lesser
rights than a probationer from one of the Douglas County district
courts merely because the Scotts Bluff judge felt that his probation officer was so heavily burdened that he could not adequately
supervise another offender 138 or because the judge was not "sold"
on probation?
As to the argument that the individual whose offense carried a
legislatively mandated sentence prohibiting the availability of
probation is not as safe a risk on parole as is the probationer on
probation, correctional authorities are cognizant of the fact that
the type of offense is not determinative of whether the offender is
or is not a safe risk.13 4 Hence, the Task Force on Corrections advocates reducing the various outright prohibitions on the probation
of certain types of offenders because such restrictions prevent the
differential treatment needed to "take into account all possible
extenuating circumstances surrounding the commission of an offense
'3 5
or the circumstances of particular offenders.'
To grant the hypothesis that a parolee is not as safe a risk
as a probationer almost compels one to accept the view that the
36
correctional programs in our penal institutions are failures,'
133

Probation District 10, which includes Scotts Bluff, Banner, Kimball,
Morrill, Cheyenne, Garden, and Deuel Counties, has but one probation officer. During 1967 the tenth district had a caseload which never
declined below 230 probationers. STATE OF NEBRASKA-CoMPosITE REPORT OF TEN PROBATION DIsTRicTs, 1967 (1968). This figure does not

include parolees, with whom probation officers outside the Lincoln and
Omaha areas are also charged with supervising. In addition, 113 presentence investigations were conducted by the District 10 officer in
1967.
While the Task Force on Corrections stresses that caseloads must
vary to enable differentiation in supervision for offenders with different needs, it recommends that caseloads average 35 per officer. Task
Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 70. While District 10 may be
the most heavily overburdened among Nebraska's probation districts,
caseloads in the other districts are likewise significantly larger than

the optimum. It should be noted that a part-time officer is being
sought to assist in District 10. See STATE OF NEBRASKA-ComPoSITE
REPORT OF TEN PROBATION DISTRICTs,
1967 (1968).
134 See Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 34.
135 Id.
136 An empirical study comparing the recidivism rates of 110 inmates
who were released from the Florida prison system at the moment
their convictions were overturned by the Gideon decision with the
recidivism rates of 110 Florida inmates who were released at the
expiration of their terms found that the Gideon motion release group
recidivated less than its counterpart expiration release group. Eichman, Impact of the Gideon Decision upon Crime and Sentencing in
Florida: A Study of Recidivism and Socio-Cultural Change, Florida
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because the parolee has been exposed to such treatment while the
probationer has not. While most correctional authorities would
concede that any rehabilitation accomplished in prison has often
been in spite of the prison environment, not because of it,13 7 this
shortcoming does not necessarily increase the risk factor of parolees.
Regardless of the institutions' present potential for rehabilitating
prisoners, Dr. Glaser's studies indicate that incarceration may deter
inmates from future crime. 3 8 In sharp contrast to popularly held
notions that recidivism rates may easily exceed fifty per cent,
Glaser's initial research leads him to postulate that perhaps twothirds of the men released from prison via parole and ultimate discharge do not return.8 9 In measuring the risk potential of inmates,
Glaser's conclusion that "[a]t least ninety per cent of American
prison releasees seek legitimate careers for a month or more after
they leave prison"'140 is of substantial significance. For if ninety
per cent of all prisoners seek to go straight upon discharge, it
seems reasonable to surmise that very few parolees will immediately return to criminal ways upon their release for supervision
in the community.' 4' Despite the incompleteness of Glaser's work,
it provides solid support for those who advocate intensive superviDivision of Corrections, Research and Statistics Section, Research
Monograph No. 2, pp. 71-73 (1966).
"If taken to its logical conclusion, the proposition which Mr.
Eichman's research supports is shocking indeed. Boldly stated it
is that if we, today, turned loose all of the inmates of our prisons
without regard to the length of their sentences and, with only some
exceptions, without regard to their previous offenses, we might
reduce the recidivism rate over what it would be if we kept each
prisoner incarcerated until his sentence expired. While of course this

much cannot be claimed for the Florida study, and is not even suggested by its author, at the very least it underscores the need for

reexamination of the purposes and consequences of present sentencing
practices." ADvisoRY CoMInvTTEE ON SENTENCING AND REVIEw, ABA
PROJECT ON MnqEMum STANDARDs PoR Canvm ALr JusTrcE, STxAnns
R
,mATIG
TO SENTENCING ALTERNATvES AND PROCEDURES 59 (Tent.

Draft, 1967).
Leopold, What Is Wrong With the Prison System?, 45 NEB. L.

REv. 33,
42 (1966).
138 See D. GLASER, THE EFFECTInNSs OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM
(1964).
'37

139 Id. at 24.
140 Id. at 475.

141 Where a state has a mandatory release statute requiring all prisoners
to experience some supervision in the community under parole rather
than outright discharge upon the expiration of their sentences, the
proportion of parolees returned to prison tends to increase. But it
should be recalled that revocation of parole is often on a technical
violation of conditions, rather than upon the conviction or accusation that the parolee has committed a new felony. Id. at 27-31.
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sion of the parolee during his first months of freedom, 14 and it
should caution those asserting that the risk posed by parolees is
sufficiently greater than that presented by probationers as to rationally justify the state's provision of a hearing and counsel for
probation revocations with its denial of these safeguards in revocations of parole. In light of Dr. Glaser's studies indicating that the
experience of imprisonment does deter men from future crime 143
and our assumption that parole boards only parole those they consider reasonable risks, the premise that parolees are significantly
worse risks than probationers appears on shaky ground.
Indeed, it has been suggested that parole boards' release decisions are better considered than those of most sentencing judges
due to the boards' correctional expertise and its advantage in having
before it not only the pre-sentence report, which was available to
the judge as a decisional aid, but also the individual's institutional record showing his adaptation to institutional life, 44 and
hopefully an examination report by a psychiatrist or psychologist. This informational advantage of parole boards is most apparent
in the many cases in which the offender's conviction is based on a
guilty plea resulting from a plea bargain.145 Negotiated guilty pleas,
whether for the purpose of reducing the potential maximum sentence or for a specific promise of probation,146 complicate the release decisions of courts and parole boards alike in that the result
is usually a misleading conviction label. Since courts exercise little
or no control over charge reduction, 147 judges often have scanty
information about the crime or the defendant, leaving them with a
142
143

144

145

146

147

See Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 68.
Following this theory, many courts do impose a short jail term as a
"condition" to probation prior to the start of the probationary period.
See fact sketch of Mempa v. Rhay, supra note 18. The propriety of
such commitments has been questioned, however, due to the incomplete research on the deterrent effects of imprisonment and particularly in those instances where a jail term may cause the offender to
lose his job. Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 34-35.
Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12
WAYNE L. REv. 638, 640 (1966). It is not contended that the parole

decision should be made upon the prisoner's adjustment to the controlled atmosphere of the prison, but it is submitted that the inmate's
institutional record will often reflect his prospects for adjusting and
integrating into the community.
It has been estimated recently that nearly 90% of all convictions are
the result of guilty pleas and, although precise data is not available,
it is known that a substantial number of guilty pleas are the product
of negotiation. Task Force on The Courts, supra note 30, at 9.
See generally Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining in Task Force
on The Courts, supra note 30, 108-19.
Id. at 109. For a discussion of the judiciary's role in plea bargaining
see id. at 117-18 and Task Force on The Courts, supra note 30, at 12-13.
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meager basis from which to make their sentencing dispositions. 148
When one who has struck a plea bargain subsequently is considered
for parole, this same lack of information concerning the offense
makes the parole decision more difficult, 149 but correctional theory
today recognizes that it is the offender's potential for making a
successfal adjustment to society which determines his readiness
for parole rather than the nature of the offense which he committed.150 Since the primary focus in granting a conditional release,
whether probation or parole, is on the offender instead of his offense,
the conclusion is compelling that the professional parole board
with its experience and training and its informational advantage
in the form of an institutional record and psychiatric tests will
generally make a wiser release decision in granting paroles than
will most judges in granting probations.
Since there is no realistic rationale for differentiating the revocation safeguards granted probationers from those granted parolees,
the establishment of such a dichotomy by judicial construction of
the Nebraska probation statutes is arbitrary and violative of equal
protection. 151 However, until courts expressly discontinue their
almost uniform denial that a parolee has any constitutional rights,
it would appear prudent to discuss the inclusion or exclusion of
particular trial-type procedures in terms of possible legislation.
Legislative proponents of such procedural safeguards should strive
to ensure that the procedural elements enacted do not conflict
with the purposes of the revocation hearing. Any discussion of these
purposes necessitates an examination of the aims of parole for
theoretically "a decision to revoke must be regarded as a decision
that desired goals would no longer be served by continuing parole
in a particular case."'1 52 Therefore, in contemplating legislative implementation of parole revocation safeguards, lawmakers should
seek to enact only those procedural elements which further the
dominant aims of parole. More specifically, it is submitted that trialtype procedures "should be incorporated only to the extent that
they do not interfere with ... the establishment of a basis for deciding what is appropriate rehabilitative treatment."'153
Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining in Task Force on The Courts,
supra note 30, 109-10.
149 Id. at 110.
150 Article 4, section 13 of the Nebraska Constitution prohibits the parole
of offenders convicted of treason or impeachment, however.
151 See Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12
WAYNE L. REv. 638, 653 (1966).
152 Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitationin Parole Revocation Hearings,
148

72

YALE L.J.

153 Id. at 373.

368, 370 (1962).
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IV. LEGISLATING PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS WITHOUT
HINDERING REHABILITATION
The two revocation functions of a board of parole consist of a
factual determination to ascertain whether there has been a violation and of an evaluation of the violator's rehabilitation potential to
discover whether he is such a bad risk that his parole should be
revoked. 15 The board must not only determine what has happened
but also must construct "a total image of an individual's situation"
in order to predict what is likely to happen. 155 While proof of a
parole violation is relevant to the revocation decision primarily in
that it establishes cause for revocation, it also sheds light upon
"the ultimate issue of what the parolee is likely to do after the
hearing."'' 1 6 Consequently, the need for accurate fact-finding cannot
be discounted for such predictions depend in large part upon the
thorough gathering of past and present facts. It is generally agreed
that when a genuine factual dispute arises as to whether a parole
violation has occurred, a hearing which embodies the following
minimal procedural elements is needed to ensure accurate factfinding: 157 (1) the right to reasonable notice of the precise charges;
(2) the right to present evidence and witnesses; 158 and (3) the right
to counsel,' 59 including counsel appointed by the parole board when
necessary. It should be recalled that the probationer in Nebraska
presently has these safeguards at his revocation hearing. 60
The necessity of providing notice and counsel has been well
documented earlier. However, there is a practical problem in allowing parolees to present witnesses which arises whenever the paNote, Rights of the Federal Parolee Threatened with Parole Revocation, 1964 WASH. U. L.Q. 335, 351 (1964).
155 Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitationin Parole Revocation Hearings,
72 YALE L.J. 368, 372 (1962).
156 Id.
157 Id. at 373-75; Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 88; Sklar,
supra note 9, at 197-98; Comment, Revocation of Conditional LibertyCaliforniaand the Federal System, 28 S. CAL. L. REv. 158, 175 (1955);
1 K. DAviS, ADmuNsTRArivE LAw TESATiE § 7.16 at 178-79 (1965
Supp.).
158 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 12 (1959); FLA. REV. STAT. § 947.23 (1) (1967);
Mic STAT. ANN. § 28-2310(1) (1968 Supp.); WASH. REV. CODE ANw.
154

§ 9.95.120 (1961).

159 There are no statutes expressly providing indigent parolees with a
right to appointed counsel. And only a few revocation statutes are
clear that a parolee can be represented by retained counsel. D.C.
CODE AwN. § 24-206 (1961); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § § 94-9838,
94-9835 (1967 Supp.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-12-19 (1966); and the
statutes of Alabama, Florida, Michigan, and Washington, cited supra
note 158.
160 See text accompanying footnotes 72-83.
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rolee's locale is a substantial distance from the place where the
board holds its hearings. This problem would be even more acute
should parolees be allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses. Of course, the difficulty can be alleviated by use of compulsory subpoenas, but this is costly and works an inconvenience
on those citizens, police officers, and parole officers called upon to
appear. It has been suggested that the board in such cases should
move the revocation hearing to the parole locale in the interest of
increasing its fact-finding efficiency. 1" Instead of burdening the
board with such costly and time-consuming trips, some states have
employed professional examiners to conduct distant hearings for
the board. 62 The examiners oversee the construction of the record
and recommend whether to revoke or not, but the ultimate decisionmaking power remains with the board of parole.
A more difficult determination is whether the parolee should be
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. It has
been advanced that because this right would require the board to
disclose its sources of information, valuable witnesses may be discouraged from presenting their evidence and the board may be
deprived of information pertinent to judging the parolee's rehabilitation potential. 63 While it is most desirable that all sources of
information be developed, a revocation procedure which permits a
faceless informer to give information against an accused and then
shields that witness from cross-examination would be contrary to
the fundamental precepts of our system of justice, which makes
no exceptions even when there exists a possibility of reprisal against
that witness.'6 The possible loss of information which might follow
from requiring the parole board to disclose its sources of information
161 Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings,
72 YAEI L.J. 368, 376-77 (1962); Sklar, supra note 9, at 195. E.g., 28
C.F.R. § 2.40 (1968).
162 It is recognized that usage of examiners by parole boards suffers from
the defect inherent in all institutional decision-making-the inability
of the parolee to confront the ultimate authority directly. In some
instances this problem might be alleviated by delegating the examiner's role to one of the parole board members. Such a proposal
would not be infeasible in Nebraska due to the relatively small parole
population and the heavy population concentration in the eastern
third of the state near the penal complex in Lincoln. It has been
suggested that in the large California parole system such local hearings might be conducted by the district parole supervisor, with the
final revocation decision reserved for the paroling authority. MUlligan, ParoleRevocation Hearings in Californiaand the Federal System,
4 CALiF. WFST. L. REv. 18, 33 (1968).
163 Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitationin Parole Revocation Hearings,
72 YALE L.J. 368, 375 (1962).

164 "Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
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and the probable complication of the revocation proceeding by
allowing cross-examination of the state's witnesses would appear
to be outweighed by the need to maintain a system of justice which
is open to public scrutiny. 165 Clearly, the right to cross-examine is
imperative if the parolee is to be guaranteed a fair hearing. Furthermore, since the information which it is feared will be lost by allowing cross-examination is most likely to be information relevant to
the parolee's rehabilitation potential, rather than factual information concerning the alleged violation,'166it is possible that a workable
compromise can be effected through the medium of a bifurcated
revocation hearing.167
The initial, more formal stage of such a hearing would determine
whether a violation has been committed, while the second stage
of the hearing would seek to evaluate the parolee as a parole risk.168
The parolee would be afforded the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses only in the first stage of the hearing.
In those cases in which there is no factual dispute, as when the
parolee has admitted the violation or has been convicted of another
crime while on parole, this first stage would be omitted. There is
some evidence which indicates that the actual number of parole
revocations involving factual disputes is small,' 69 so authorization of
cross-examination in the first stage of the hearing should not unduly
hamper the board's disposition of revocation cases. However, should
the number of parolees contesting violation allegations rise significantly upon being awarded counsel and the other recommended
safeguards, the parolee's unqualified right to cross-examine might
of necessity require some modification, such as limiting it to the
extent the parole board deems desirable to bring out the facts. 70
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends
on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case
must be disclosed on the individual so that he has an opportunity
to show that it is untrue.... This Court has been zealous to protect
these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal
cases.., but also in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
496-97 (1959).

Sklar, supra note 9, at 195.
166 Most parole officers, in the opinion of the author, will realize that the
determination of a parole violation is analogous to the adjudication
of original guilt and will be hesitant to make a violation charge unless
they feel the evidence and witnesses will stand up in a hearing.
167 Note, Rights of the Federal Parolee Threatened with Parole Revocation, 1964 WASH. U. L.Q. 335, 354 (1964).
168 Id. at 351-54.
169 See Sklar, supra note 9, at 192 n.138, 193 n.143, 197 n.176.
170 1 K. DAvis, Awv-STRATMV
LAW TREATxSE § 7.16, at 179 (1965 Supp.).
Michigan may be moving toward this position as it recently repealed
165

COMMENTS
The second step in the hearing will only be reached should a
violation be proved or admitted in the first stage.171 It would embrace a subjective policy determination very similar to the original
parole granting decision-whether despite the violation the parolee's
generally good behavior and progress or the extenuating circumstances of the breach merit continuance of his parole. While it has
been suggested that the parolee only be afforded a chance to explain his conduct, 172 a better approach would permit the parolee's
witnesses to also present the positive aspects of his behavior. 73
This would enable full presentation to the board and would somewhat counterbalance the practicality that due to the limitations
on parole officers' time their reports as to the parolee's behavior
will concentrate on its negative aspects. 74
its statute providing parolees with the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses at their parole revocation hearings. Pub. Acts 1968, No. 192.
It seems probable that administrative convenience weighed heavily
in bringing about this procedural change, but as this article goes to
press the author has been unable to obtain either the legislative history concerning this procedural modification or any new rules which
may have been prescribed by the director of corrections under the
replacement statute's express delegation of rule-making authority.
The current statute affords the parolee a hearing in accordance
with the rules and regulations adopted by the director of corrections

at which the parolee "shall be given an opportunity to appear personally or with counsel and answer to the charges placed against him."
Micni.
STAT. AN. § 28.2310(1) (1968 Supp.). Although cross-examination has been removed as a statutory right, it appears that the
director of corrections can implement and/or qualify the right through
his rule-making power.
171 If rehabilitation were the sole purpose of parole, it might follow that
parolees should be recommitted, even though they have not violated
any condition of their paroles, when there has been a change in their
circumstances which seriously diminishes the possibility of help in
the outside world. Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole
Revocation Hearings, 72 YALE L.J. 368, 378 (1962).
However, such a view is not too likely to prevail because of the
not unfounded fear that the state's rehabilitative aims when not
harnessed by minimal legal controls can lead to a malevolent tyranny
perpetrated in the name of humanitarianism, C. S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, reprinted in DONNELLY, Gor.msTm &
ScHWARTZ, CRnIMNAL LAW: PROBLEMS FOR DECISION IN THE PROMULINVOCATION AND ADMfNISTRATIoN OF A LAW Or CRIMEs 499
(1962). The Nebraska Supreme Court's recent decision in State v.
Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968), cannot help but swell
the numbers of those adhering to Lewis' theory. See generally Note,
The Sterilization of the Mentally Deficient- A Reasonable Exercise
of the Police Power?, 47 NB. L. R-v. 784 (1968).
Sklar, supra note 9, at 197.
Comment, Freedom and Rehabilitationin Parole Revocation Hearings,
72 YALE L.J. 368, 375-76 (1962).
GATION,

172
173

174

Id.
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Provision of the suggested safeguards will not turn parole revocation hearings into legal battlegrounds. There are no voices urging
that there be jury trials or that determinations of violations require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The experiences of Washington
and Michigan, which provide a hearing and the opportunity to appear with retained counsel, indicate that provision of procedural
safeguards at parole revocation proceedings does not discourage parole boards from granting paroles. 17 5 Instead, the proposed procedure implemented through a bifurcated hearing will guarantee the
parolee a fair opportunity to meet the charges against him and will
both expand and authenticate the information available to the
parole board, thereby improving the accuracy of the revocation
17
decision.
175
176

See text accompanying footnotes 88-89.

It is submitted that the following statute embodies the needed safe-

guards to ensure the parolee a fair hearing and affords the parole
board sufficient flexibility to make a meaningful evaluation of the
parolee's rehabilitation potential:
(1) Whenever a paroled prisoner is accused of a violation of his
parole, he shall be entitled to a prompt hearing of such charges
before the Board of Parole, and in no case shall such hearing be held
more than 30 days after the arrest of the parolee. The revocation hearing shall consist of two stages. Stage 1 of the hearing shall be a factual
determination by the board of whether the parolee did in fact violate
the conditions of his parole. If no violation of parole is found in Stage
1, as determined by a preponderance of evidence, the parolee shall
be reparoled and the hearing shall be concluded. When the parolee
has admitted the parole violation or has been convicted of another
crime which would be a felony or misdemeanor under the laws of
this state while on parole, the hearing will omit Stage 1 and begin
with Stage 2. Stage 2 of the hearing shall consist of a policy determination by the board of whether the parolee represents such a bad risk
that his parole should be revoked due to the violation. The board
may order revocation of parole if it is satisfied that the parolee has
failed, without a satisfactory excuse, to comply with a substantial
requirement imposed as a condition of his parole and that the parolee's
violation of condition involves conduct indicating a substantial risk
that the parolee will commit another crime. Parole revocation shall
be by majority vote of the board.
(2) During Stage 1 of the parole revocation hearing, the parolee
shall have the following rights:
(a) reasonable notice of the precise charges, which will state the
time, place, and issues involved;
(b) representation by counsel, including counsel appointed by the
Board of Parole should the parolee be unable to otherwise procure
such legal assistance;
(c) presentation of evidence and witnesses in his favor;
(d) confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses who are produced against him [as the Board of Parole deems it desirable to bring
out the facts]; and
(e) if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the board that there is
a material witness in his favor without whose testimony he cannot

COMMENTS

V. CONCLUSION
While Mempa v. Rhay demands that probationers be granted a
hearing and an attorney at their revocation proceedings, it must be
conceded that the Court's weak articulation of its rationale prevents
truly persuasive application of the Mempa holding to parole revocations. Nonetheless, the Court's rationale in cases such as Gault
and Mathis hints that such a decision may not be long in forthcoming. While it is more conjectural whether additional procedural
safeguards are required, the right of cross-examination and the privilege against self-incrimination seem so fundamental as to also be
within the purview of due process.
The possibility of the judiciary imposing inflexible and unrealistic requirements on revocation proceedings is a real one, but its
probability will diminish significantly should correctional officials
initiate adequate procedural reforms on their own. With legisla17
tive or administrative implementation of such internal controls, 7 it
is quite possible that maximum legitimate discretion can be retained
in the hands of correctional experts for it will be less necessary for
courts "to intervene to define necessary procedures or to review
the merits of correctional decisions." 1 78 Such action should not be
taken begrudgingly for a revocation hearing conducted with the
proposed safeguards will further the correctional goal of rehabilitation by ensuring that the parolee is given a fair hearing and should
also prove economical in that it will make certain that those parolees
who have not committed parole violations are continued on parole.
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safely proceed to hearing, and that such paroled prisoner is without
funds and cannot obtain the means to procure the attendance of such
witness at the place of hearing, the board shall have power to issue
a subpoena to compel the attendance of such witness, or any other
witness.
(3) During Stage 2 of the parole revocation hearing, the paroleeshall have the following rights:
(a) to be informed of the evidence against him;
(b) to advise with counsel;
(c)to present evidence and witnesses in his favor; and
(d)to explain or offer rebuttal evidence.
While the Omnibus Treatment and Corrections Bill approved in principle by the Governor's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice is an enlightened piece of correctional legislation in its
entirety, it makes no effective change in the present Nebraska parole
revocation procedure. While the proposed statute requires that the
board of parole find a parole violation before it can revoke parole,
the board can make this determination ex parte as a revocation hearing is left to the discretion of the board. Omnibus Treatment and Corrections Act § § 46-47 (Proposed Draft 6, 1968), L.B. -, 80th NEB.
LmG. SEss. (1969).
Task Force on Corrections, supra note 1, at 83.

COMMENTS
In addition to improving decision-making, fair hearings will
increase the parolee's confidence that correctional officials are
interested in his success. A fair hearing will benefit the parolee
even in terms of treatment, for by directly involving him in a decision vital to his interests, his self-reliance and problem-solving
abilities will be strengthened. 179 One of the practical realities encouraging the expanded use of parole has been the great cost saving
achieved by the state when it supervises a man on parole rather
than maintaining him in prison. Recent estimates point toward a
cost figure for the state in supervising a parolee that is but onetenth the cost of keeping a convict imprisoned. 18 0 And these figures
neither include the reduction in welfare costs when a man released
on parole begins to support his family again nor the added tax
revenues to the state as a result of the parolee's earnings. Therefore, economic considerations likewise demand that great care be
taken to prevent arbitrary re-incarceration of an individual whom
the parole board has previously found to represent a reasonable
risk to society.
But the foremost reason for extending procedural safeguards
to the revocation proceeding is that parole should represent a guarantee to the parolee that he will not be reimprisoned unless he
violates certain defined conditions. The board of parole in granting
his conditional release exhibited its confidence in the parolee's
rehabilitative potential. Revocation without affording the parolee
the opportunity to truly meet the violation charges is totally alien
to the parole concept for it prevents any re-evaluation of the individual's rehabilitative potential. It is perhaps a greater injustice to
reimprison one who has not committed an alleged parole violation
or who having committed the violation does not represent an unacceptable risk to society than it is to deny parole to the inmate who
represents a minimal risk. It should not therefore be forgotten that
although parole is a privilege, there is no justification either in
terms of due process or correctional objectives to revoke a man's
parole arbitrarily.' 8 '
Russell E. Lovell II, '69
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Id. at 64.
Id. at 28; Comment, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and
Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 702, 705-06 (1963).
"'One may not have a constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but the
Government may not prohibit one from going there unless by means
consonant with due process of law.'" Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961).

